THE, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
International Law-Judicial Interference with Foreign Affairs-Proving Acquisition of Title to Property by Foreign Government-[Federal].-The plaintiff, rebelcontrolled branches of the Bank of Spain,' sued the defendants, a federal reserve bank,
a steamship company, and the superintendent of the United States government assay
office, 2 to recover a shipment of silver which the Spanish Loyalist Government sold to
the United States. The Loyalist Government had obtained possession of the silver
from the Bank of Spain by secret decree. The plaintiff argued that the decree failed to
pass title to the Loyalist Government because it was made by government officials acting for private gain and was not published as required by law. On appeal to the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit from a judgment for the defendants, held, that
the Secretary of the Treasury's determination that the Loyalist Government had title
to the silver is not conclusive in court; that on independent determination by the court,
the Loyalist Ambassador's assertion of title is probably sufficient, but that, in any
event, the proof of the particular governmental orders and decrees purporting to transfer title is conclusive. Judgment affirmed.3 Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank.4
Although courts recognize the desirability of protecting the United States in its
conduct of foreign affairs from interference by domestic courts,s legal doctrines developed to accomplish this result fail to cover all the situations where such interference
6
may occur, and do not completely cover even the specific problem of purchases from a
foreign government, involved in the instant case.7 If the purchase is by treaty, courts
8
deny themselves jurisdiction on the ground that a "political question" is involved.
Or if the title to the property is attacked by suit against the United States, governx The newspapers spoke of the plaintiffs as "agents of Franco." New York Times, col. 6,
p. 32 (June 5, 1938). At the commencement of the present suit the Franco Government had
not been recognized by the United States. Since an unrecognized government or an agency
created by it probably cannot sue in American courts, the plaintiff's power to sue seemed
doubtful. Dickinson, The Unrecognized Government or State in English and American Law,
22 Mich. L. Rev. 29, ii8 (1923). The subsequent recognition of the Franco Government on
April 2, i939, before the present case was decided, apparently removed this objection.
2 The Federal Reserve Bank acted as fiscal agent for the United States, the steamship
company brought the silver to the United States, and the superintendent had custody of the
silver.
3 The court also affirmed the dismissal of the suit against the superintendent as being in
effect a suit against the United States and violating the government's immunity from suit.
4 114

F. (2d) 438 (C.C.A. 2d i94o).

s See notes 8 and 15 infra.
6 See, e.g., the litigation involving property of Russian corporations in the United States.
Confiscation and Corporations in Conflict of Laws, 5 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 28o (1938); Guaranty
Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938).
7In terms of real parties, the instant case was a suit by the Nationalist Government of
Spain, at first unrecognized, and later recognized as the successor of the Loyalist Government.
Its original purpose was to tie up the proceeds from the silver sale so that the money could
not be used to purchase munitions for the Loyalist Government.

s Clark v. Braden, 16 How. (U.S.) 635 (1853) (refusal to inquire into validity of treaty
with the King of Spain, selling Florida to the United States and revoking land grants to
Spanish citizens); Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 Minn. L.
Rev. 485 (1924); Weston, Political Questions, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 296 (i925).

RECENT CASES
mental immunity prevents judicial interference.9 On the other hand, if the United States
has to sue for possession of property purchased from a foreign government, it is forced
to prove to a domestic court the validity of the foreign government's title. Similarly,
if the government in obtaining title employs private agents, as was done in the present
case, suit may be brought against the agents. This possible liability of the agents may
make it difficult for the government to secure agents, and may even impose liability on
the government because of a moral obligation to compensate agents who have been
forced to pay a judgment. Moreover, the danger that the government's title to property purchased from a foreign government may be contested impairs the marketability
of the property. 0
Undesirable judicial interference might be eliminated by extending governmental
immunity to agents of and purchasers from the government. Such an approach, however, not only seems to be barred by prior decisions," but is also contrary to the legislative trend toward reducing governmental immunity.12 Nor would extension of governmental immunity aid the United States where it is suing for possession of property.
A second possible solution would be for the courts to refuse to take jurisdiction on the
ground that a "political question" is involved.3 Application of this doctrine, however, has usually been confined to cases involving a transfer by treaty, 4 and there is
small likelihood that courts will apply it in cases where an agent or a purchaser is involved. The third possibility, and the one adopted by the court in the instant case, is
to hear the case but to apply the well-recognized rule of international law that courts
will not sit in judgment on the legality of a foreign government's acts within the foreign government's jurisdiction.s Application of this rule, of course, tends to prevent
embarrassment of the United States government in the conduct of foreign affairs only
when the property is within the jurisdiction of the foreign government at the time of
the transfer. 6 Moreover, the extent to which the application of the rule prevents em9 See note 3 supra.
10Cf. The Tervaete, [1922] Prob. 197, 259 (no maritime lien on ship owned by Belgian

Government at time of collision but subsequently transferred to private party because imposition of such a lien after the ship passed into private hands would deprive the Belgian Government of some of the value of its property).
- Freund, Administrative Powers over Persons and Property §§ 128-33 (1928).
e.g., McGuire, Tort Claims against the United States, 19 Georgetown L.J. 133
(1931); Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. r, 32 (1924).
12 See,

'3

Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in Federal Courts, 8 Minn. L. Rev. 485 (1924);

Weston, Political Questions, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 296 (1925).
'4 Clark v. Braden, i6 How. (U.S.) 635 (1853).

"5Underhill v. Hernandez, i68 U.S. 250 (1897); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S.
297 (i918); Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918); Hewitt v. Speyer, 25o Fed.
367 (C.C.A. 2d i918); The Claveresk, 264 Fed. 276 (C.C.A. 2d 1920); Luther v. James Sagor &
Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 532 (C.A.); Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz, [1929] 1 K.B. 718 (C.A.). Contra:
Canada Southern R. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527 (1883) (court upheld validity of Canadian
statute, but its authority to try that issue was not questioned); Sabariego v. Maverick, 124
U.S. 261 (i888); Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468 (1937) (court denied effect to acts of Mexican

Government with respect to land which had subsequently been included within the United
States).
'6 Compare the problem involved in the attempted confiscation by the Soviet Russian
Government of assets in the United States of Russian insurance companies and the subsequent
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barrassment depends upon the kind of proof required as to acts of the foreign government. The position of the court in the instant case, requiring proof of the particular
governmental acts upon which the foreign government's assertion of title was based
and refusing to adopt the statement of the accredited representative of the foreign
government as conclusive proof of the fact that the foreign government has executed
those acts, may cause serious embarrassment. This approach imposes on the United
States the almost impossible task of determining, before purchasing, what acts took
place in the foreign state and of obtaining sufficient proof of the acts to satisfy a
domestic court. Such an inquiry might affront the foreign government. Moreover,
since acts of a foreign government need not be even "colombly valid,"'7 and since,
therefore, any acts claimed by the foreign government to be sufficient to pass title have
that effect, it would seem that the "acts" themselves become irrelevant. For instance,
where the foreign government's acts take the form of a sectet decree transferring title
to it, proof of governmental acts ultimately depends on statements of government officials. The only effect of the requirement of proof of the particular acts would be to
change the result of a case in which proof of the acts is not possible. If the foreign government is no longer in existence, as was almost the situation in the instant case, it may
be impossible to obtain proof of any "acts" of the government.
It appears to be preferable, then, for courts to accept the statement of the representative of the foreign government as conclusive. An analogy is found in an English case s
in which, when the diplomatic immunity of an alleged member of a foreign mission was
in question, it was held that a statement by the foreign office was conclusive. Even if
this rule were adopted in cases involving purchase by the government, it would not
necessarily be applicable to cases involving purchases by private persons. In the latter
cases, embarrassment to the United States in the conduct of foreign affairs is more remote and can arise only if the foreign government takes offense at the domestic court's
decision and makes diplomatic representations. But even here, judicial interference
violates the foreign government's immunity from suit by compelling it to defend its actions in court 9 and injures the market for its property.2 0

Labor Law-National Labor Relations Act-Employer Required to Embody Collective Bargaining Agreements in Writing-[Federal].-The petitioner, an employer,
having arrived at an accord as to wages, hours, and conditions of work with the coltransfer of claims to such assets to the United States government. Confiscation and Corporations in Conflict of Laws, 5 Univ. Cli. L. Rev. 280 (1938); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United
States, 304 U.S. x26 (1938). A similar problem now exists with respect to Dutch, Danish,
Norwegian, Belgian and Latvian assets being held by American banks. See The Chase Wants
to Know, 37 Time, No. 7, at 57 (Feb. 10, i941).
17 14
F. (2d) 438, 444 (C.C.A. 2d 1940). In Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz, [1929] I K.B.
718 (C.A.), the original seizure of the property was by local soviets without authority from a
government, but the Soviet Government later ratified the seizure.
8iusmann v. Engelke, [1928] 1 K.B. 9o (C.A.) (statement of foreign office conclusive as
to diplomatic status of member of Germany Embassy staff).
9The Jupiter (No. 2), [1925] Prob. 69; The Jupiter (No. 3), [1927] Prob. 122; The Jupiter
(No. 3), [X927] Prob. 250 (C.A.) (Soviet Russia defended its title for purchaser of property).
20See note io supra.

